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Disciplining Legal Scholarship
Lynn M. LoPucki*
US. law schools are hring large proportions of JD-Ph.Ds in tenum-track faculty
positions in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of empincallegal scholarsh. That
effort is faling. The newrecruits bringmethods and objectives unsuitedto law Theypmduce
lower-than-predictedlevels ofempircism because they compete on the basis ofmethodological
sophistication, devote time and resources to disputes over arcane issues in statistics and
methodology prefer to collaborate with other Ph.Ds, and intumidate emphicists whose work
does not require high levels of methodological sophistication. In short Ph.Ds impose the
cultures oftheirdisciplineson legalscholarship
Importingpeople rather than ideas from other disciles threatens the role of legal
scholarship as a &sci1larymeetingground The iisk is that substitutingdiscplinaryscholars
for legal scholars will substitute discilinaryscholarship for the interdiscipinatyscholarsp
currentlyprevalentinlaw One scenarioby which thatmight occurisforPh.D hiringto become
ubiquitous, for the dscilines to divide the fields of law among them, and for peerreview to
eliminatelegalscholarshipthatfails tomeet Ascilinaryrequirements.
My vision is one in which empicism is distinguishedfrom statistics, methodological
sophisticationis valued only as a means ofdiscovery and all legal scholars feel free to report
empical findings. Two changes are central to achieving that vision. The first-ady
implemented in some schools-is to provide empircallegal scholars with assistancefrom nontenure-trackfaculty statisticians. Doingso will relieve the pressure on law faculties to acquire
statisticalexpertisebyhiringPh.Dsin tenure-trackpositions. The second is to bida cultur in
the law schools that values empircal discovery and the advancement of knowledge over
methodologicalsophistication.

*
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Academic disciplines, such as economics, political science, and
physics, are both culminations of past progress and barriers to future
progress. The past progress is reflected in the discipline's record of
discoveries-its accepted truths, methods, and theories.
Those
discoveries are also the barriers to future progress. They prevent those
within the discipline from seeing or considering other possibilities.'
Universities have long encouraged interdisciplinarity in part as an
antidote to the disciplines.2
Disciplines are, however, capable of mimicking interdisciplinarity
and sometimes do so as means of expanding their turf and seeking
access to new resources. Professor Jack Balkin analogized that form
of interdisciplinarity to the process of colonization:
It is an attempt by disciplines to expand their empires, to colonize and
to take over other disciplines by extending their sphere of influence over
them. If this colonization is sufficiently successful, it will not even be
understood as a colonization. It will simply be seen as part of the

1.

Gary Poole, Academic Disciplines: Homes or Baricades?, in THE UNIVERSITY

AND ITS DISCIPLINES:

TEACHING AND LEARNING WTHIN AND BEYOND DISCIPLINARY

BOuNDARiEs 50, 51 (Carolin Kreber ed., 2009) ("The disadvantage is that the discipline
discourages diverse thinking patterns, epistemologies, or approaches to problems. The
discipline stays insular and homogenous.").
2.
Eg., Appendix 37: InteiuhsciplharyAcdvity, UCLA AcAD. PERSONNEL OFF.
(Jan. 24, 2006), https://www.apo.ucla.edu/policies/the-call/appendices-1/appendix-37interdisciplinary-activity ("The essential question that is under review is the quality of the
work, not its adherence to the vision of a restricted departmental mission.").
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general methodology of the colonized discipline. The old discipline
continues to exist, but with a new methodology, a new set of questions
for study, or new criteria of Kuhnian "normal science." Alternatively,
the colonized discipline will simply seem to disappear, absorbed into
the conquering discipline or reconceptualized as a subspecialty.
Assessing the situation in 1996, Balkin wrote that law looked
"like a sitting duck for a disciplinary takeover.'" He noted that "the
past twenty to thirty years in legal scholarship seems to have been one
of continual invasion, as turncoats have attempted to import insights
from many different fields, most prominently including economics,
history, philosophy, political theory, and literary theory."' As of his
writing, the effects were entirely positive. As Balkin stated:
[W]e are currently living in one of the most exciting eras of legal
scholarship. The legal scholar now confronts a dizzying array of
competing disciplines and approaches. Law has become a sort of
meeting ground for academic ideas and trends. And because it has
become an interdisciplinary crossroads-affected and infected by so
many different influences-law has become, as perhaps never before in
American history, one of the most absorbing intellectual subjects.'
Balkin was not concerned that disciplinary scholarship would
replace legal scholarship through colonization, because he believed
that "no invasion of law can ever be fully successful."' A central part
of his reasoning was that social science empiricism was at the core of
the invasion, and "[a]lthough law professors often claim to be
empiricists, they actually do not really want to do any empirical
research."' He attributed the colonizing success of economics in law to
its abandonment of empirical content:
"Economics had to be
translated into a style of argument compatible with the basic skills
academic lawyers already possessed. For if it could not be so
translated, it would not spread widely into a culture of people trained
primarily as lawyers."'
"[M]ost prospective academics," Balkin
assumed, "are simply not going to get Ph.D.s in economics."o
3.
J.M. Balkin, Interdisaplmanty as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949,
960-61 (1996).
4.
Id. at 965.
5.
Id
6.
Id at 970.
7.
Id. at 965.
8.
Id. at 969; accordWilliam M. Landes, The EmpiricalSide ofLaw & Economics,
70 U. CI. L. REv. 167, 180 (2003) ("It would only be a modest exaggeration to say that most
law professors regard empirical work as a form of drudgery not worthy of first-class minds.").
9.
Balkin, supra note 3, at 968.
10. Id. at 969.
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Events in the two decades since Balkin wrote, however, have
brought his no-Ph.D. assumption into question. Large numbers of
prospective legal academics are getting Ph.D.s-in economics and in
other potentially colonizing disciplines. In the period from 2011
through 2015, 48% of entry-level, tenure-track hires at top-26 law
schools were Ph.D.s." In 2014 and 2015, that rate was 67%.12 This
Article explores the implications for empirical legal scholarship of
continuing Ph.D. hiring at such high levels.
The principal argument for hiring more Ph.D.s-and the only one
addressed in this Article-is that Ph.D. hiring will improve the quality"
and the quantity 4 of empirical legal scholarship. The argument has
two prongs. I refer to the first as the Simple Addition Argument: the
additional Ph.D.s will produce empirical legal scholarship of higherthan-average quality, thus increasing both the amount and the average
quality of empirical legal scholarship. Professor Jeffirey Rachlinski put
the Simple Addition Argument this way:
The attractiveness of J.D./PhDs (in any field) to law faculties is not
hard to understand. Why hire someone with only a J.D. when you can
have someone from a top school who not only has the ID. but also
many years of additional training? Furthermore, that additional training
is in how to produce scholarship-something law schools do not train
their J.D. candidates to do.
The Simple Addition Argument fails four ways. First, the
empirical evidence shows that entry-level J.D.-Ph.D. hiring is at best a
trade-off rather than an addition. To gain a hire's experience in a Ph.D.
program, the hiring school gives up, on average, more than three years
of experience in law practice or clerkship-65% of the entire
experience in law practice or clerkship that a non-Ph.D. hire would

11. Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn ofthe Discipline-BasedLawFaculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author).
12. Id.
13. Eg., Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empiical Legal Scholarship Mn
Law Reviews, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCI. 581, 595 (2010) ("One possibility is that the
increasing number of JD/PhDs in the legal academy will improve the quality of the research
submitted for publication and, ideally, that law reviews will use that faculty expertise to
advise them on the quality of submitted empirical work.").
14. E.g., Tracey E. George, An EmpiicalStudy ofEmphicalLegal Scholarship: The
Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 150 (2006) ("[A] law school with a greater proportion of
its faculty holding social science doctorates is more likely to produce [empirical legal
scholarship] than a law school with a lower proportion.").
15. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Essay, Evidence-BasedLaw, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 908
(2011).
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have brought to the job." J.D.-Ph.D.s no longer spend more total time
than I.D.-only professors in preparing for their tenure-track positions."
Second, Ph.D. empirical training is specific to the nonlaw
disciplines that administer it. That is, a Ph.D. program trains scholars
to use data from the discipline's traditional sources to answer the
discipline's traditional questions, using methods tailored to those data
and questions." By contrast, J.D.-only empiricists' practice experience,
superior subject-matter expertise, and greater knowledge of potential
data sources better position the ID.s to ask, and answer empirically, the
questions central to law using uniquely legal data sources such as court
files, transcripts, and judicial opinions.
Third, Ph.D. hiring does not increase the quantity of empirical
legal scholarship in proportion to the numbers of Ph.D.s added.
Because disciplinary empiricism competes on the basis of
methodological sophistication, it tends to produce small numbers of
large studies instead of filling law's need for pervasive empiricism. By
"pervasive empiricism" I mean the production of original or derivative
empirical support for all of the contestable factual assertions made in
legal scholarship. Pervasive empiricism ranges from factual anecdote,
through small-n studies without statistics, to large-scale, methodo-

logically sophisticated studies.

Because disciplinary empiricism

focuses on method rather than results, it diverts resources to expensive
work at the high end of the methodology spectrum and away from
work in the remainder of the spectrum. Some of the resources are
diverted off the spectrum entirely, into disputes over arcane issues in
statistics or the disciplines' methodologies."
Fourth, prominent social scientists have intimidated many J.D.only empiricists by demanding that empirical legal scholarship comply
with social science "rules of inference."20 The effect is to deter the
production of empirical legal scholarship.2 1 Although no one has
shown that Ph.D. empiricists are more likely than I.D.-only empiricists
to adhere to social science "rules of inference," the issue is itself a red
16.
LoPucki, supra note 11 (manuscript at 31) (finding that J.D.-Ph.D. hires had an
average of 1.7 years of practice plus clerkships, as compared with 4.8 years for hires holding
J.D.s, but not Ph.D.s).
17. Id. (manuscript at 32-33) (finding that iD.-Ph.D. hires spent an average of 12.1
years from bachelor's degree to their first tenure-track position in an U.S. law school, as
compared with 12.7 years for professors holding J.D.s, but not Ph.D.s).
18.
SeeinfrdPartVB-C.
19.
SeeinfmdPartVA.
20.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 1
(2002).
21.
SeeinfraPartVB.
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herring.
Even if such rules are necessary for large-scale,
methodologically competitive social science studies, they are
completely impractical for the pervasive empiricism needed in law. 22
The second prong of the argument for Ph.D. hiring, which I will
refer to as the Collaboration Argument, is that the new Ph.D.s on law
faculties will collaborate on empirical projects with J.D.s on the
faculties. Because the ID.s lack the requisite skills to do studies alone,
the new Ph.D.s are needed to enable them to become empiricists. The
quantity of empiricism will increase because more scholars will be
engaged in it. The quality of empiricism will improve because
collaborative scholarship is generally of higher quality than
noncollaborative scholarship.23
The Collaboration Argument contains kernels of truth. The data
show that adding Ph.D.s to law faculties does result in collaboration
between J.D.s and Ph.D.s. Collaboration probably does tend, on the
whole, to improve the resulting scholarship. But the collaboration
benefits from adding Ph.D.s are modest for three reasons. First, the
Ph.D. collaboration rate in law is relatively low. 24 Second, J.D.-Ph.D.s
prefer collaboration with other Ph.D.s to collaboration with J.D.-only
professors." Third, studies have found that collaborations produce less
than their proportionate share of the most influential scholarship.26
The arguments for Ph.D. hiring often assume that the competition
is between J.D.-Ph.D. empiricists with years of empirical training and
J.D.-only empiricists with none. A better description is that the
competition is between J.D.-Ph.D.s who attempt to be both statisticians
and subject-matter experts and J.D.-only empiricists who can develop
greater subject-matter expertise because they are not engaged in
methodological competition. Instead, the ID. empiricists employ
simple, straightforward empirical methods. When more is necessary,
they collaborate with Ph.D. statisticians who hold non-tenure-track
positions.27
22. SeeinfraPart VA.
23.
See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Joining Forces: The Role of
Collaborationm the Development ofLegal Thought 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 559, 582 (2002).
24. SeeinfiaPart I.
25. Seefm/hPart II.
26. George & Guthrie, supranote 23, at 568-72 (reviewing several impact studies and
concluding that coauthored articles accounted for 15% of law review articles, but only 4% to
11% of the most influential law review articles); id at 571 (noting that only 10% of the 100
articles on Krier and Schwab's list of the most cited law review articles were coauthored,
while 15% of all law review articles were coauthored).
27. See hfia Part III.
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I do not argue that holding Ph.D. degrees should disqualify
applicants for law teaching jobs. Some of the best legal scholars hold
Ph.D. degrees. Ph.D.s may confer important advantages with respect
to some kinds of law-related empiricism and in some nonempirical
areas.28 My argument is merely that hiring Ph.D.s and ID.-Ph.D.s in
tenure-track positions is not an effective means of systematically
increasing the quantity or improving the quality of empirical legal
scholarship. To the contrary, in the short run, Ph.D. hiring threatens
both the quantity and quality of empirical research. In the long run, it
threatens to change the nature of law schools from meeting grounds
for academic ideas and trends to colonies ruled by nonlaw disciplines.
Part II of this Article presents empirical findings showing that the
Ph.D. collaboration rate with J.D.s is too low to justify Ph.D. hiring.
Part IR explains the alternative to hiring Ph.D. empiricists in tenuretrack positions. That alternative is to hire statisticians in non-tenuretrack positions to assist J.D. empiricists.
Part IVA argues that the standard for quality in empirical
research should be discovery and knowledge advancement, not
methodological sophistication. Part IVB provides empirical evidence
that Ph.D. empiricists are less likely than J.D. empiricists to address
research questions that are legal in nature. Part IVC argues that the
methods and habits of Ph.D. empiricism are less likely than those of
J.D. empiricism to yield discovery and advance knowledge in the field
of law. In particular, that Part describes data showing that Ph.D.
empiricists are less likely to engage with legal materials than are J.D.
empiricists.
Part V argues that Ph.D. hiring has not yet produced the promised
increases in empirical legal scholarship and attributes the failure to the
escalation of method resulting from Ph.D. hiring and to the
intimidation of J.D. empiricists. The Article concludes that the
continued hiring of J.D.-Ph.D.s at current rates will shift control of
legal empiricism to the Ph.D.s' home departments and cut the legal
academy off from its principal source of intellectual vitality-legal
practice.

28. See, e.g., Allen Mendenhall, The Importance of Being Earnest: A Serious
ProposalTo Modify Legal Research and Wnting Departments, W VA. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2007,
at 32, 32 (advocating the hiring of English Ph.D.s to teach legal writing).
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PH.D. COLLABORATION

Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has argued that "[s]ocial scientists,
by nature, collaborate. Because collaborative work is a core aspect of
their training, they will look for collaborators among their colleagues.
Social scientists are thus apt to spread their methods among the
faculties that they join."29
Empirical evidence indicates that Rachlinski is correct to a
limited extent. Ph.D.s on law faculties, including J.D.-Ph.D.s, do
sometimes collaborate with J.D.s. But they exhibit a strong preference
for collaboration with other Ph.D.s. For example, in a study of sixty
articles published in the Joumal ofEmpiricalLegal Studies and sixty
articles published in top student-edited law reviews, I found that 79%
of Ph.D. collaborations were with other Ph.D.s and only 21% were
with J.D.s." The corresponding figures were 55% and 45% for D.Even at that considerably better rate, "JD.-Ph.D.
Ph.D.s.
collaborations with Ph.D.s were nearly double the number expected if
the J.D.-Ph.D.s had chosen their collaborators randomly, and J.D.-Ph.D.
collaborations with J.D.s were only 64% of the number expected."" In
that study, I also found that J.D.-Ph.D.s collaborated with ID.-only
professors on only one-third of the J.D.-Ph.D.s' empirical articles.32
Those findings indicate that Ph.D. and J.D.-Ph.D. hiring do result
in collaborations between Ph.D.s and ID.-Ph.D.s. But a collaboration
rate of 33% cannot justify Ph.D. hiring. The alternative to hiring
Ph.D.s in tenure-track faculty positions is to hire statisticians in nontenure-track positions. As explained in the next Part, such hiring can
achieve close to a 100% collaboration rate, with all of that
collaboration within the paying school's own faculty.
III. THE STATISTICS-EMPIRICISM DISTINCTION
The argument for Ph.D. hiring in tenure-track positions is
essentially that empiricism is so difficult that only a person with years
of training can do it well.
[R]igor (at least by social science standards) requires particularized
research training. Most social scientists spend five to ten years in
doctoral study, learning the methods and theories that orient work in
29. Rachlinski, supranote 15, at 908.
30. Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplinary Legal Empiricism 15 (May 17, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
3 1. Id. atl 6.
32. Id. at 17.
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their disciplines. They conduct original research under the oversight of
PhD committees composed of seasoned scholars, and in the process
they learn how to analyze, write up, and publish their findings. By
contrast, U.S. law schools continue to offer primarily preprofessional
curricula for lawyers, not scholars."
Thus, Ph.D.-hiring advocates seek to pose the issue as competition
between the trained and the untrained. The issue is better posed as
how law faculties can best acquire the statistics expertise its members
need to make empiricism pervasive.
The Ph.D.-hiring advocates' argument mistakes statistics for
empiricism. Because it is a mathematical, gigantic, and rapidly
expanding field, statistics is so difficult that only a person with years of
training can do it well. But empiricism-by which I mean locating
information sources, figuring out what questions they can answer,
converting those sources into data, presenting the data in tables and
graphs, using statistical software to run simple tests, and drawing
inferences from the statistical findings-is far less difficult.
From 2006 to 2009, Elizabeth Warren and I first collaborated on,
and then for two years cotaught, the Empirical Analysis of Law
seminar at the Harvard Law School. Our goal was to develop a
teaching method that would enable students with no prior knowledge
of empiricism or statistics to plan, conduct, and report empirical
studies in a four-hour, two-semester seminar. In the two years we
cotaught the seminar, more than half of the students published their
empirical studies. Several of the publications were in the peerreviewed Ameican Bankmptcy Law Journal
Separation of empiricism from statistics was the lynchpin of our
method. With our assistance, the students designed their own studies.
The Harvard Law School, following the model earlier adopted at the
UCLA School of Law, provided a non-tenure-track statistician to assist
the seminar students. The statistician taught an individual student only
that narrow area of statistics needed for the particular study. Crucially,
the statistician also provided assurance prior to submission and
publication that the statistics were correct.
Separation of empiricism from statistics enables faculty in the
same way it enables students. With the assistance of a statistician,
substantially every law professor can be a quantitative empiricist. To
illustrate the potential, at the UCLA School of Law, where Professor
33. Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism:
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV L. & Soc. SCI. 555, 572
(2010).
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Joseph W Doherty provides empirical and statistical assistance, fortytwo of sixty-one tenure-track faculty members (69%) have published
original empiricism.34 Following Shari Diamond and Pam Mueller,
Doherty and I defined "original empiricism" as "the systematic
organization of a series of observations with the method of data
collection and analysis made available to the audience."" Although
comparable figures for schools that rely on tenure-track Ph.D.s to
furnish statistical expertise are not available, I doubt that the
proportions of the members of their faculties who are publishing
original empiricism could be nearly so high. As shown in Table 1, the
rate of publication of original empiricism at UCLA is slightly higher
among non-Ph.D.s than among Ph.D.s."
Table 1. UCLA Tenure-track Law Faculty Publication of
Original Empiricism by Degree Type
Empirical
No Empirical
Total
Publication
Publication
20
8
12
(100%)
(40%)
(60%)
41
11
30
(100%)
(27%)
(73%)
61
19
42
(100%)
(31%)
(69%)
Chi-square, p =.380
D. Phil.s are included as Ph.D.s. IS.D.s are not included
as Ph.D.s.

Perhaps recognizing the threat that separation of empiricism from
statistics posed to their claims about the difficulty of empiricism, Lee
Epstein and Gary King argued that the separation could not be made:
A methodologist is an academic-in the field of law, a law professor-

who focuses on, contributes to the field of, and applies quantitative and
qualitative legal methodology. Because statistics and research design
are not "merely technical," as is, say, plumbing, "staff statistician"
positions generally do not work in this context. Law schools need
creativity in methods, not a technician who merely applies existing
techniques by rote to legal scholarship-a path that generally leads to
34. Infra Table 1.
35. Diamond & Mueller, supra note 13, at 582 (quoting Shari Seidman Diamond,
EmphicalMarineLife in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, andPlankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
803, 805).
36. The difference is not statistically significant.
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the use of methods that do not comport with the needs of researchers.
Just as in any other field, methodology is a creative endeavor and
cannot be delegated to anyone other than another scholar."
Epstein and King provided neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence
for their factual assertion that staff statistician positions generally do
not work. Contrary to that assertion, several top-tier law schools have
already adopted the staff statistician model," and more are joining
them."
Epstein and King's assumption that statistics and research design
are not merely technical is also wrong with respect to the vast majority
of empirical legal studies. In that vast majority, the empiricist applies
basic empirical techniques to a previously unexplored part of the legal
system. Methodological creativity is unnecessary. Its presence may
impair the study's utility by making the claimed discoveries more
difficult for the researchers to communicate and for the users of the
research to evaluate.
When creative methodologies are needed, non-tenure-track
methodologists are likely more capable than tenure-track law
Non-tenure-track methodologists
professors of providing them.
generally devote their full time to teaching methodology and providing
37. Epstein & King, supra note 20, at 122-23.
38. The Yale Law School, the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and
the Duke Law School currently employ Ph.D.s with backgrounds in statistics to assist their
faculties with empirical research. Library Staff Dhrectory: Saaid Ryan, YALE U. LIBR.,
http://resources.library.yale.edu/StaffDirectory/detail.aspx?q=692 (last visited Oct. 6, 2015)
("Sarah Ryan is the Head of Empirical Legal Research Services and a Lecturer in Legal
Research at Yale Law School. She teaches ... Empirical Legal Research and consults on the
design of empirical dissertations, substantial papers, and SAWs."); Faculty Profiles.: SU Lt,
U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.
php?faclD-14054 (last visited Oct. 6, 2015) ("Su Li joined Berkeley Law in January 2010, as
the statistician for the school of law. She works with professors, editors of the California Law
Review, J.D. and Ph.D. students, as well as affiliated researchers and scholars on research
papers/projects, government reports, law suit cases, and dissertations."); GuangyaLiu, PhD,
DuKE U. L. SCH., https://law.duke.edu/fac/liu/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015) ("Guangya (Ya) Liu
joined Duke Law School as an Empirical Research Analyst in 2011. Dr. Liu provides
consultation to faculty on all facets of empirical research. . . .").
39. Both the University of Virginia School of Law and the NYU School of Law are
currently advertising for Ph.D.s with backgrounds in statistics to assist their faculties with
empirical research. Empirical Researcher, HIGHEREDJOBs, https://www.higheredjobs.com/
details.cfm?JobCode=1 76099997&Title=Empirical%20Researcher (last visited Oct. 6, 2015)
("The law library at the University of Virginia School of Law is seeking an Empirical
Researcher to assist library patrons on complex research initiatives involving advanced
statistical techniques .... ); CareerOpportunityDetails: EmpiicalResearch Methodologis
AM. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.afajof.org/details/job/8061701/Empirical-Research-Methodo
logist.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015) ("[T]he Empirical Research Methodologist will be
responsible for ... working with the NYU School of Law faculty to conceptualize, design
and execute empirical research . . .").
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methodological assistance across a variety of areas of law. Tenuretrack professors are part-time methodologists. Each typically teaches
at least two nonmethodological courses and maintains an expertise in
at least one substantive area of the law. Other things held equal, fulltime methodologists will be better than part-time methodologists.
Epstein and King's use of the plumbing metaphor for non-tenuretrack statisticians is an allusion to the difference in status between
tenure-track and non-tenure-track faculty. The inference they drawthat the tenure-track hires will be smarter and more creative than the
non-tenure-track hires-would be warranted if scholars chose their jobs
based solely on status and if tenure were the only source of status. But
some scholars will choose the work they most enjoy over the work
with the highest status, and even in academia, higher pay is sometimes
capable of offsetting other sources of status. Many Ph.D.s who could
have qualified for tenured positions in academia prefer to work as
economists, political scientists, and policy analysts at think tanks such
as the Rand Corporation. Some also prefer to work as methodologists
in law schools.
Even if the law schools must pay more for non-tenure-track
methodologists than they pay for tenure-track professors, the law
schools will gain advantage by hiring them. The law school that hires
a tenure-track methodologist can only hope that the methodologist will
continue to do empirical work, collaborate with nonmethodologists on
the faculty, read their manuscripts, and answer their questions. But, as
already noted, J.D.-Ph.D.s often do not collaborate. When they do,
they tend to collaborate with other Ph.D.s. Even when they collaborate
with J.D.s, it may be with ID.s at other schools. Lastly, some Ph.D.s
hired for their empiricism choose to do other kinds of scholarship.40
Thus, hiring Ph.D.s in tenure-track positions is an inefficient means of
satisfying the needs of a law school's faculty for statistical expertise.
Unless tenure-track Ph.D.s are particularly good citizens, their
hiring may leave faculty who are in need of assistance with statistics
not only without collaboration but perhaps even without anyone to
read the statistics portions of their manuscripts or to answer their
questions. If instead the law school hires a statistician as a non-tenuretrack faculty member, the law school can make assisting faculty and
students part of the job.
The Harvard Law School hired its first non-tenure-track
statistician at Warren's request, to assist the students in our seminar.
40.

See discussion inhf Part VC.
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The faculty's need for statistical assistance was so great that requests
for it quickly exceeded what one person could provide. The law school
hired a second non-tenure-track statistician before the first had even
begun work. Similar levels of unmet demand for statistical assistance
probably exist at other law schools.4 1 The appointment of non-tenuretrack statisticians is likely the most cost-effective way that most law
schools can promote empirical legal scholarship.
Empirical methods, as distinguished from statistical methods, are
subject-matter and data-source specific. A bankruptcy empiricist
knows a great deal about bankruptcy law, the sources of bankruptcy
data, how to work with those sources, and what kinds of discoveries
would contribute most to the field.42 A methodology expert trained in
the methods of political science, economics, or finance probably
would know none of those things. As Professor Theodore Eisenberg
wrote: "[N]onlawyers have the distinct disadvantage of often not
understanding legal doctrine or the state of the law. This sometimes
leads to blunders that compromise empirical analyses. The need for
legally sophisticated empirical analysts is clear."'
The most valuable thing that a methodologist can bring to a
collaboration with a legal scholar doing empiricism is statistics.
Statistics are not subject-matter or data-source specific. If data have
been translated into numbers, it no longer matters whether the numbers
represent bankruptcies, criminal sentences, or automobile accidents.
The implication is that a statistician can more easily collaborate across
fields of law than can an empiricist. As a result, one or two
statisticians may be able to meet the needs of an entire law faculty.
IV. DISCIPLINE'S EFFECT ON THE QUALITY OF EMPIRICISM
A central argument for Ph.D. hiring is that Ph.D.s' training in
empirical methods will enable them to produce better legal
empiricism." The argument fails in two respects. First, proponents of
the argument have adopted the wrong standard-methodological
sophistication-for judging the quality of empiricism. Under the
correct standard--discovery and advancement of knowledge-a
41. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
42. See Robert M. Lawless, What Emphical Legal Scholars Do Bes4 87 TEMP. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author) ("Perhaps the most
significant strength that empirical legal scholars possess is an understanding of fine-grained
institutional detail in the legal system.").
43. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Emphical Legal Scholarship, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1741, 1741 (2004).
44. See, eg., Diamond & Mueller, supm note 13, at 594-95.
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system that includes the non-tenure-track hiring of statisticians will
produce higher quality empiricism. Second, Ph.D. programs train
candidates for empiricism in the programs' own disciplines, not for
empiricism in law. Legal empiricism uses different data sources and
requires different methods to answer different questions.
A.

QualityStandard

Advocates of Ph.D. hiring frequently advocate that faculties
judge candidates on the basis of their methodological training and
sophistication rather than on their ability to achieve discovery and
advance knowledge.
For example, Professor Lior Strahilevitz
complains, "The legal academy probably focuses too much attention
on the results of the empirical research project, particularly when
hiring entry-level scholars."' He advocates that hiring committees
"ignore the findings" of a job applicant's empiricism and "emphasize
the methodology."'
To the contrary, hiring committees should be doing the same
thing with respect to empiricism that they do with respect to other
scholarship: assessing the value of the scholar's contribution to the
field. "Methodological sophistication" is a commonly used euphemism
for statistical sophistication. For some kinds of empiricism, statistical
sophistication may be necessary, but for most kinds, it is not.
The most powerful empirical studies typically rely on simple
statistics combined with effective visual displays. As the statistical
methods become more complex, empirical findings become less
convincing. At high levels of sophistication, empirical studies become
"black boxes," understandable only to statistics experts who devote
substantial amounts of time to the particular study. If the statistics
experts differ regarding the study, the research no longer has any value
to scholars in the substantive field. Worse yet, if no one devotes the
considerable time that may be necessary to discover that a study is
erroneous, future research may shift in unproductive directions.
The subject-matter experts have a long tradition of highly
successful quantitative legal empiricism. Luminaries include Ted
Eisenberg, Marc Galanter, Bob Lawless, Stewart Macaulay, Ronald
Mann, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook, to name just a few.
Although no one has yet attempted to measure the outcome of the
45. Lior Strahilevitz, We Are All EmpiricistsNow, so Which Empicists Should We
Hr. PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 17, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2012/04/we-are-all-empiricists-now-so-which-empiricists-should-we-hire.htm.
46. Id.

2015]

DISCIPLININGLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

15

competition between Ph.D. methodologists and J.D. subject-matter
experts, my impression, based on observation over a thirty-five-year
career, is that the "amateurs'"' have been more successful in
advancing empirical knowledge in their respective fields than have the
Ph.D.s. "Getting institutional detail right can ...

lead to discoveries

that otherwise might not have appeared."'
Even if following social science rules were the sole criterion of
quality, the critics of legal empiricism have not shown that those with
formal training follow them better. Epstein and King appeared to
many to claim such a showing when they launched this attack on
empirical legal scholarship:
[ TJ he currentstate ofempiicallegal scholarship is deeply flawed We
base this claim primarily on a review we conducted of the legal
literature-a review that revealed many proceeding with research
agendas, however diverse their goals might be, with little awareness of,
much less compliance with, the rules of inference that guide empirical
research in the social and natural sciences. The sustained, selfconscious attention to the methodology of empirical analysis so present
in the journals in traditional academic fields .. . that is, the articles
devoted to methodology in these disciplines-is virtually nonexistent in
the nation's law reviews. As a result, readers learn considerably less
accurate information about the empirical world than the studies'
stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions suggest.49
But buried in Epstein and King's 133-page article was an
acknowledgment that they had not compared empirical legal
scholarship with social science scholarship and made no claims as to
what such a comparison might show: "[W]e do not mean to suggest
that empirical research appearing in law reviews is always, or even
usually, worse than articles in the journals of other scholarly
disciplines.""o In a reply to their critics, Epstein and King reiterated
and relied on the disclaimer."
Nor do Epstein and King provide any evidence for the superiority
of Ph.D.-authored empiricism, even when judged by social science
standards. They studied all of the articles published in law reviews
47. Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do FactsPelsuade? Some Thoughts on the Market
for "EmpiricalLegal Studies, " 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 33 (2008) (referring to the
"amateur empiricists, who do not have Ph.D.s or formal methodological training and who
may be guided more by instrumental than scientific concerns").
48. Lawless, supm note 42 (manuscript at 8).
49. Epstein & King, supranote 20, at 6-7.
50. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
51. Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 191, 200 (2002).
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over a ten-year period, including those publshed by Ph.D.s52 They
found that every article violated their "rules of inference."" The
logical conclusion is that every Ph.D.-authored article violated those
rules.' In my study, I found that 55% of the empirical studies
published in leading law reviews had at least one Ph.D. author." If that
ratio held for the law review empiricism Epstein and King studied,
Ph.D.s were authors on more than half of the offending articles.
B.

Research Questions

Ph.D.s come with baggage. Their training has prepared them to
answer social science questions from social science data sources using
social science methods. As the Yale Law School stated in explaining
the need for its Ph.D. in Law Program, "Ph.D. programs in economics,
political science, history and other fields train scholars to produce
research responsive to the questions central to those disciplines. The
scholarship produced by law faculties, and expected of candidates for
teaching positions at law schools, is largely motivated by different sets
of questions.""
The path of least resistance for Ph.D.s hired onto law faculties is
to keep doing the kind of work for which they were trained. Thus,
Ph.D.s hired to bring their skills to bear on legal questions instead
frequently bring them to bear on the questions of the Ph.D.s' home
disciplines." As Balkin put it:

52. Epstein & King, supm note 20, at 15-16 ("We thus began by casting the net very
widely, reading all 231 articles published in allAmerican law reviews between 1990 and 2000
that had the word 'empirical' in their title.").
53. Id. at 17 ("[E]very [article] we have read thus far ... violates at least one of the
rules... .").
54. See Richard L. Revesz, A Defense ofEmpiricalLegal Scholarshio, 69 U. CI. L.
REv 169, 185 & n.88 (2002) (noting that Ph.D.s were authors of several of the articles
Epstein and King criticized).
55. LoPucki, suprd note 30, at 18 (finding that 55% of the empirical articles
published in top-26 law reviews had at least one Ph.D. author).
56.
Why a Ph.D. 6 Law., YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/graduate/phd
why.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). Whether the Yale Ph.D. in Law Program will actually
train students to explore legal questions or merely replicate the social science programs
remains to be seen.
57. See Stephanie Davidson, Way Beyond Legal Research: Understand2g the
ResearchHabitsofLegal Scholas, 102 L. LIBR. J. 561, 577 (2010) ("Scholars emerge from a
Ph.D. program socialized to that discipline's questions, ideas, paradigms, methods, and
language."); Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword, Is It Tine for a New Legal Reaksm. 2005
Wis. L. REv. 335, 337 ("[S]ocial scientists may also prefer to frame their investigations solely
with reference to theories and questions from their own fields . . . .").
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Disciplines provide their members with tools of understanding. By
providing people with some tools rather than others and by enhancing
some skills at the expense of others, disciplines necessarily push their
members toward asking the kinds of questions with which these tools
are best equipped to deal and treating all other questions as variants of
these."
Requester data from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research
Database (BRD) illustrates this relationship between discipline and
question type. The BRD collects and disseminates research-ready data
on large public company bankruptcies." Since 2008, it has also
collected data on BRD data requesters' institutional affiliations and
research topics."o For 755 of the 812 requests during that period, the
BRD has both the institutional affiliation of the requester and the topic
of research.
In general, the data show that legal scholars have tended to

address issues of policy and institutional function, while economics
and finance scholars have sought to test the rational actor model, the
efficiency of markets, and the optimal strategies for investing. For
example, bankruptcy prediction was by far the single most popular
topic of requester research. Ninety-five of the 755 requests for data
(13%) were for bankruptcy prediction projects. As shown in Table 2,
75 of those 95 requests (79%) were from business schools, 13 (14%)
were from economics departments, and only 1 (1%) was from a law
school.
Table 2. BRD Requests, by Requesters' Disciplines and Whether
the Request Was for a Bankruptcy Prediction Study
Bankruptcy
Other
Total
Prediction
Requests
Requests
Requests
553
478
75
Business schools
(79%)
(72%)
(73%)
Economics
13
66
79
departments
(14%)
(10%)
(10%)
1
76
77
Law schools1767
(1%)
(12%)
(10%)
6
40
46
(6%)
(6%)
(6%)
Total
95
660
755
58. Balkin, supra note 3, at 955.
59. UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. REs. DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last visited
Sept. 5, 2015).
60. See OngoingResearch, UCLA-LOPucKi BANKR. RES. DATABASE, http://lopucki.
law.ucla.edu/ongoing research.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
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Table 2. BRD Requests, by Requesters' Disciplines and Whether
the Request Was for a Bankruptcy Prediction Study
Bankruptcy
Other
Total
Prediction
Requests
Requests
Requests
100%
(100%)
(100%)
Source: UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database
Chi-square, p-.009

Of the 775 requests, 632 (84%) came from business schools or
economics departments and 77 (10%) came from law schools. If
bankruptcy prediction requests had been randomly distributed among
these requester groups, 84% (80) would have been expected to come
from business and economics and 10% (10) would have been expected
to come from law. The difference between these expected levels and
the actual levels is statistically significant (p-.009)." Predicting
bankruptcy is a business and economics topic.
Sales under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
were another popular topic. That topic accounts for 17 of the 755
requests for the BRD (2%).62 Of those 17 requests, 3 (18%) were from
business or economics and 13 (76%) were from law. The difference
between these levels and the levels expected if disciplines' requests had
been randomly distributed among topics is statistically significant
(p<.001).13 Section 363 sales are a law topic.'

If business scholars obtained law degrees and joined law
faculties, these kinds of differences would not likely disappear. By the
time business scholars complete their Ph.D.s, they have learned to use
the vast accounting-based datasets on Wharton Business Data Services
and been trained in statistical techniques specifically developed for
that purpose." They are unlikely to develop the new skills or
61. Chi-square. The actual requests were eighty-eight from business and economics
and one from law, compared with expected requests of eighty (84%) from business and
economics and ten (10%) from law.
62. I omitted an eighteenth request from consideration. The request was from a
UCLA joint degree candidate (law and business) for a project in my law school bankruptcy
empiricism seminar. The project was such a thorough mix of the two disciplines that I
concluded it could not be counted as evidence of either.
63. Fisher's exact test. The actual requests were three from business and economics
and thirteen from law, compared with expected requests of fourteen (84%) from business and
economics and two (10%) from law.
64. Although "363 sales" is legal jargon, there were no requests from business or
economics that described any kind of bankruptcy sale as the topic. There was one request
from law for "bankruptcy sales."
65. For example, all of the empirical curricular offerings of the Kellogg School are
business-subject specific. The statistics courses are "Outside of Kellogg"--principally in the

2015]

DISCIPLINZNG LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

19

undertake the new training necessary to study legal institutions, such
as 363 sales, forum shopping, or case duration.
Although many legal scholars recognize "the critical role of
substantive, institutional knowledge in empirical inquiry" and the
necessity to "grappl[e] with substantive law,"' disciplinary scholars
tend to be blind to both. For example, Ph.D.-hiring advocate David E.
Van Zandt wrote:
Law and legal institutions are merely a subset of social and political
phenomena that are studied every day in economics, political science,
and other departments. Being social products, they are formed and
operate on the same principles as any other social phenomena. Those
phenomena can be usefully analyzed from any number of discrete
disciplinary perspectives."
What Van Zandt fails to note is that in the all-Ph.D. law school, the
useful analysis will differ by discipline, and none of the disciplines will
have a law professor's understanding of the institutions and the law or
be asking the law questions.
For decades, Ph.D.s have asked their own disciplines' questions
about the legal system from outside the law schools. More recently,
substantial numbers of Ph.D.s from economics, political science, and
other disciplines are now asking those questions from inside the law
schools. Their perspective is a narrow one. For example, in describing
"empirical legal studies," Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein
characterized it as essentially the study of the effect of political
ideology on judicial decision making-a staple question studied in
political science."
The empiricists who are legal subject-matter experts are
principally the ones asking the legal questions. To what degree are
particular legal institutions successful in achieving the purposes for
which they were created? How much does law cost and what are the

social sciences. See PhD Empircal Methods Courses, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT. Nw U.,
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/programs/doctoralprogram/programs/empiricalcourses.
aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
66. Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction, The EmpicalRevolution in Law,
65 STAN. L. REv. 1195, 1201 (2013); see, eg., Barry Friedman, Takng Law Seriously, 4
PERSP. ON PoL'Y 261, 262 (2006) (stating that political science positive scholars "need to pay
greater attention to the norms of law, i.e., how law and legal institutions operate").
67.
David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 334
(2003).
68.
See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The NewLegal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 831, 833-35 (2008).
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effects of costs on outcomes?" What happens during the litigation
process? During the legal counseling process? What (besides judges'
"political ideolog[ies]"" and "demographic characteristics"")
determines litigation outcomes? What is the quality of the legal
services various kinds of lawyers deliver, and what are the
determinants of that quality? None of these are questions that other
disciplines ask, and none are questions that other disciplines have
prepared their Ph.D.s to answer.
C

ResearchMethods

Advocates of Ph.D. hiring tend to lump the quantitative methods
of the various disciplines together under the phrase "methodological
sophistication."72 But in actuality, most disciplines have developed
quantitative methods uniquely suited to the source data they use and
questions they address. Thus, econometrics is "[t]he branch of
economics concerned with the use of mathematical methods
(especially statistics) in describing economic systems,"" sociometry is
"the measurement of attitudes of social acceptance or rejection through
expressed preferences among members of a social grouping,"7 and
biometry is "[t]he application of statistical analysis to biological
data."75 A basic text describes econometrics as a method for
economists to "sift through mountains of data to extract simple
relationships."7 ' No such mountains exist in most areas of law, and the
extraction of simple relationships has less importance in legal
69. Eg., LYNN M. LoPUcKI & JOSEPH W DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION (2011).
70. Miles & Sunstein, supm note 68, at 836.
71. Id. at 840.
72. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supranote 20, at 17 n.41.
73. Econometrics, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definitions/americanenglish/econometrics (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). Another source
states:
Econometrics is the art and science of using data to test various economic theories.
More specifically, econometrics can be viewed as the use of mathematics and
sophisticated statistical modelling to test economic or financial theories as well as
forecast the effects of changes in economic or financial factors under various
scenarios.
Defhnition ofEconometrics, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.f.com/Term?termeconometrics (last
visited Sept. 5, 2015).
74. Sociometry, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sociometry
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
75. Biometry, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defintion/
english/biometry (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
76. PAULA. SAMUELSON &WLLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcoNOMICS 5 (18th ed. 2005).
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empiricism than the mapping of previously unexplored areas. Some
colonizers claim to be adjusting the methods of their home disciplines
to law," but they do not explain how."
1.

Hypothesis Testing

The methods of other disciplines are, in many instances, poorly
suited to law. For example, social science empiricists are committed to
hypothesis testing." When initiating any empirical research in the
social sciences, one must begin with a hypothesis.o But for serious
empirical legal scholars, discovery is most often the objective, and
hypothesis testing simply gets in the way. As Elizabeth Warren and
Jay Westbrook put it in defending a proposed bankruptcy study:
We understand much of the critique of our approach at the Conference
to be reducible to a complaint that we go forth to find facts without
some large theory that generates all the hypotheses we will test. For
that reason, it is important to acknowledge clearly that we are doing just
that and that we make no apologies....
We believe that to indulge in the hubris of a grand theory would
actually prejudice our efforts. We do not wish to be prisoners of our
articulated hypotheses. We deliberately overcollect data, unsure at this
77. Eg., Epstein & King, supm note 20, at 1 ("[T]his Article adapts the rules of
inference used in the natural and social sciences to the special needs, theories, and data in
legal scholarship . . . .").
78. I agree with Lawless that "empirical legal scholars should be developing new
methodologies that are particularly suited to the study of the legal system." Lawless, supra
note 42 (manuscript at 15). But at this stage of development, it is more important that legal
empiricism be free of the methodological constraints of other disciplines than that legal
empiricism develop its own methodologies.
79. In their canonical text, King, Keohane, and Verba endorse the mandatory
hypothesis view:
So our basic rule with respect to altering our theory after observing the data
is: v can make the theory less estrictive (so that it covers a broaderrange of
phenomena and is exposed to more opportunitiesfor falsification), but we should
not make it more restrictive without collectingnew data to test the new version of
the theory. If we cannot collect additional data, then we are stuck; and we do not
propose any magical way of getting unstuck.... Who would not prefer one solid
negative finding over any number of flimsy positive findings based on ad hoc
theories?
GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 22 (1994).

80. W Lambert Gardiner, Cratingand Using Computer-Based Tools for Scholarsin
the Hunanities, 8 RE. COMM. 64, 66 (2008) (claiming that "science ... must start with a
hypothesis"); Nancy Huber, An ExperientialLeadershipApproachfor Teaching Tolerancefor
Ambiguity, 79 J. EDUC. FOR Bus. 52, 53 (2003) (referring to "traditional scientific discovery,
in which one begins with a hypothesis and sets out to prove or disprove it by amassing
factual, tangible evidence").
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stage when we might record data that fit no established hypotheses but
that, in the serendipity of exploration, might give us some critical
insights into the bankruptcy system."
The most effective techniques for empirical discovery do not seek
to confirm hypotheses. One such technique, often referred to as
"grounded theory," seeks to infer patterns directly from the data source
as part of the coding process.82 Another important technique-running
statistical tests to discover the unhypothesized correlations in data-is
often referred to derisively by social scientists as "data mining."83
Leading social scientists would ban its use.' But most social scientists
are data mining surreptitiously," and many are now doing it openly. In
contrast to the social sciences, the business schools have embraced
"data mining" and offer courses in it."

2.

Coding

Statistical analysis is a comparison of the differing characteristics
of similar things." The things compared-for example, cases, judges,
statutes, or mortgage lenders-are referred to as "observations.""
Information about observations can be analyzed statistically only if it

81. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization
Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1269-70 (1994).
82.
Eg., KATHY CHARMAZ, CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY 2-3 (2006); BARNEY
G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY 1 (1967).

83.

Chris Chatfield, Model Unceruinty DataMinng andStatisticalInference, 158 J.
and data
dredgingare sometimes used in this context to describe [the situation where the analyst looks
at a new set of data with virtually no preconceived ideas at all]." (citation omitted)).
ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 419, 426 (1995) ("The rather derogatory terms data ming . .

84.

See KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supranote 79, at 20-21.
See David Collier et al., Sources ofLeverage in CausalInference: Toward an
Alternative View ofMethodology, h RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY 161, 172 (Henry E. Brady

85.

& David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) ("Both quantitative and qualitative researchers routinely
adjust their theories in light of the data-often without taking the further step of moving to
new data sets in order to test the modified theory."); Confidence Intervals and Hypothesis
Testing, GREG KOCHANSKI 3 (Feb. 28, 2005), http://kochanski.org/gpk/teaching/040Oxford/
confidence.pdf ("The hard part about hypothesis testing, which is ofien violated to some
degree, is that you can only use your data once." (emphasis added)); Mark J. Whittingham et
al., Why Do We Still Use Stepwise Modellhg in Ecology and Behaviour?, 75 J. ANIMAL
ECOLOGY 1182, 1184 (2006) (reporting a study finding that 57% of sixty-five studies
reported in three leading ecology journals used a stepwise procedure).
86.
Textbook companies now publish texts for use in data-mining courses. See, e.g.,
DAVID OLSON & YONG SHI, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS DATA MINING (2007).

87.
See StatisticalAnalysis: What Is It?, SAS, http://www.sas.com/en-us/insights/
analytics/statistical-analysis.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).
88.
See R. GNANADESIKAN, METHODS
MULTIVARIATE OBSERVATIONS 195 (2d ed. 1997).

FOR

STATISTICAL DATA

ANALYSIS

OF

20 151]

DISCIPLININGLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

23

is in the form of numbers in a two-dimensional matrix." Each row
contains the information about one of the observations, and each
column contains the information about one of the characteristics. The
number at each row-column intersection represents a particular
characteristic of the particular observation.
Coding is the conversion of information from the raw form in
which it exists in the world to the numeric form in which it exists in
the matrix. Coding can be a simple mechanical process. For example,
the observations might be people and the sole characteristic of study
might be their height. The researcher can measure the height of each
person and record it in inches.
If the study is of a complex social phenomenon, such as big-case
bankruptcy, coding can be deeply theoretical.90 The researcher must
decide whether the observations will be cases or companies and, if so,
what constitutes a case or a company. If the study is about turnaround
managers, the researcher must determine who qualifies as one. For
example, the researcher might decide to consider anyone referred to by
the company or the court as a turnaround manager to be one.
Alternatively, the researcher might include only someone hired to
manage or might also include turnaround management firms when
hired to advise but not manage. The category of turnaround managers
might be limited to persons who work for firms engaged in the
business of turnaround management or include anyone with prior
experience managing companies in financial difficulty. To identify
these choices and make them in a manner that will yield meaningful
statistics requires a deep understanding of the reorganization process.
Researchers can acquire the necessary expertise by means such as
participating in bankruptcy cases, by interviewing participants, and by
reviewing court files.
During coding, researchers frequently encounter problems of
classification that challenge the categories on which conventional
theories are based. For example, saving companies-enabling them to
continue to operate-is generally regarded as one of the main purposes
of bankruptcy. But when has the company been saved? Clearly Pan
American World Airways (Pan Am) was not saved when it shut down
89. See CoMMuNrry TOOL Box ch. 37, § 5, http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/
evaluate/evaluate-community-interventions/collect-analyze-data/main (last visited Sept. 6,
2015).
90. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62
UCLA L. REv. 970, 979-80 (2015) (describing theoretical problems in coding whether
companies survived bankruptcy).
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its business and sold its assets piecemeal, even though its name and
logo were sold to a start-up airline that operated as "Pan Am.'"' Nor
was Lehman Brothers saved when the bulk of its operating assets was
sold to Barclays Bank.92 But what about a company that fires all of its
employees, moves managers and/or assets to a new location, and hires
new employees," or a company that sells the airline it operates and
uses the proceeds to buy a different airline?94 To code whether
companies continue to exist requires that the researcher determine the
essence of a company. The coding process brings such theoretical
questions to the attention of the researcher and forces the researcher to
answer them."
Researchers who work with preexisting datasets miss such
opportunities for discovery. They may engage with their data while
failing to engage with their subject.
In a recent study of empirical studies, I found that J.D.-only legal
empiricists were about twice as likely as Ph.D. legal empiricists to
code the data they analyzed." That finding has three implications for
the comparative quality of Ph.D. and J.D. legal empiricism. First, if
empiricism is given its ordinary meaning-the observation of
reality-much Ph.D. legal empiricism does not meet the definition. It
is better described as "statistical analysis." Second, Ph.D. legal
empiricism is largely confined to that narrow, conventional range of
inquiry for which someone has already coded the data. J.D.
empiricism is free to go anywhere. Third, because J.D. empiricists do
more coding, they tend to develop greater expertise regarding the
subject of inquiry, while Ph.D. empiricists tend to develop greater
91. PAN A"
PioneerAirine Takes a Downward Sphal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14,
1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-14/business/fi-656_1-united-airlines/2.
92. Ben Livesey & Yalman Onaran, Barclays Buys Lehman US. Units for $1.75
Billion (Update 3), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2008, 3:15 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMYLIP9BZTXI&refer-home.
93. Keim Mills is the example used by Baird and Rasmussen. See Douglas G. Baird
& Robert K. Rasmussen, TheEndofBankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 751, 772 (2002).
94. During the bankruptcy case, Air Florida sold the airline it operated under that
name and purchased Pocono Airlines. See Disclosure Statement Concerning Debtor's
Amended Consolidated Reorganization Plan at 22-23, In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc., No. 84-01223
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 20,1986) (No. 84-01223-BKC-SMW).
95. The Bankruptcy Research Database attempts to report how long firms continue
to exist after bankruptcy. The BRD defines a firm as "the web of employment relationships
that made the debtor a firm." Lynn M. LoPucki, Protocols for the UCLA-LoPucki
BankruptcyResearch Database,UCLA-LoPucKI BANKR. RES. DATABASE 24 (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/documentation/Protocols.pdf (protocol for determining when a
firm no longer exists); see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature ofthe BankruptFirm: A Response
toBairdandRasmussenNTheEnd of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REv. 645,656-59 (2003).
96. See LoPucki, supranote 30, at 24.
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expertise regarding existing datasets and methods of statistical
analysis.
For hundreds of years, published opinions have been the principal
data source for study of the legal process. In just the past decade, a
new and better source has become available-the full text of federal
court files through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) service." Like published opinions, this new source arrives in
the law schools uncoded. Neither Ph.D.s nor ID.-only professors have
yet moved in substantial numbers to exploit the new source." But J.D.only professors are better-positioned to exploit court file information
because J.D.-only professors have more experience in legal practice
and are more inclined to code than are their Ph.D. counterparts."
V.

DISCIPLINE's EFFECT ON THE QUANTITY OF EMPIRICISM

Advocates of Ph.D. hiring argue that Ph.D.s will produce more
empiricism." Consistent with their argument, as the numbers of
Ph.D.s on law faculties have increased in recent years, so have the
quantities of empirical legal studies published in law reviews. Some
now view empiricism as a commodity that can be purchased in the
form of trained Ph.D.s.
Despite continuing increases, however, empiricism's proportion
of legal scholarship remains surprisingly low. Although the proportion
of Ph.D.s on top-26 law faculties was about 24%"' to 27%" in 2010,
Tom Ginsburg and Thomas Miles found, in a study of major articles in
top-15 law reviews, that "the rate of empirical articles rises from

97.
See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology Distict Courts, and Doctrne, 85
WASH. U. L. REv. 681, 728 (2007) ("The project of studying dockets ... should soon
revolutionize how the new legal realists will approach the problem of quantitative research.").
98. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 25-26 (finding that among empirical legal studies
in which the researchers coded their own data, 18% were studies of court file documents and
that Ph.D.s and J.D.s who coded were about equally likely to code court file documents).
99. See supm note 96 and accompanying text.
100. Eg., George, supra note 14, at 150 ("Thus, a law school with a greater proportion
of its faculty holding social science doctorates is more likely to produce ELS than a law
school with a lower proportion."); Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 907 (naming "a growth in the
number of entry-level faculty members possessing empirical training" as one of the three
factors that explain the quick growth in empirical legal studies).
101. LoPucki, supra note 11 (manuscript at 7-8) (finding that 24% of top-26 law
school faculty held Ph.D. degrees in 2010).
102. Joni Hersch & W Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal
Education, 8 REv. L. & EcoN. 487, 489 (2012) (finding that 27% of top-26 law school faculty
held Ph.D. degrees in 2010).
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slightly more than five percent in 2000 to about ten percent in 2010. ""1'
Ginsburg and Miles commented that "the low incidence of empiricism
even at the end of the decade may surprise critics who believe that
legal empirical studies is overdone."" The proportions of empirical
legal scholarship in lower-down law reviews are much lower still.'o5
Although Ph.D. hiring has tendencies to increase the quantities of
legal empiricism, it also has at least two important tendencies to reduce
the quantities of legal empiricism. First, it generates an unproductive
Second,
methodological competition that absorbs resources.
disciplinary action by Ph.D.s intimidates non-Ph.D.s who would
otherwise have produced useful legal empiricism. In addition, some
Ph.D.s with empirical training choose not to use it once they hold
tenured positions.
A.

The EscalatdonofMethod

Methodological sophistication is one of the ways that scholars
compete for jobs, honors, and attention. The other way is through
discovery and knowledge advancement. Only the discoveries and the
knowledge have intrinsic value. But methodological sophistication is
an easily measured manifestation of scholarly potential, and, as
previously noted,'06 some scholars regard it as the best indicator of
scholarly potential. In response, candidates and young scholars
compete to master and deploy the most sophisticated methodologies.
Scholars capable of doing methodologically sophisticated work
are in theory also capable of doing the methodologically
unsophisticated work that legal scholarship most needs. But once a
scholar has invested in methodological sophistication, it makes little
practical sense for the scholar to do work in which methodological
sophistication confers no advantage. Having acquired the skills-and

103. Tom Ginsburg & Thomas J. Miles, Empiricism and the Rismg Incidence of
Coauthoshipin Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1785, 1803; accordDiamond & Mueller, supm
note 13, at 592 ("[O]riginal empirical work still accounts for only a modest portion of the
work published in law reviews.").
104. Ginsburg & Miles, supranote 103, at 1803.
105. See Diamond & Mueller, supra note 13, at 590-91 (reporting that the rate of
empirical articles in top-10 law reviews increased from 7.7% in 1998 to 8.5% in 2008, while
the rate of empirical articles in law reviews ranked 61-70 increased from 1.9% in 1998 to
6.1% in 2008 and the rate of empirical articles published in law reviews ranked 121-130
increased from 1.2% in 1998 to 3.3% in 2008); see also Michael Heise, An Empical
Analysis ofEmpirical Legal Scholarship Pmducdon, 1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1739
(reporting further increases by 2009 but not reporting proportions).
106. See supm notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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foregone the opportunity to acquire other skills or knowledge"oscholars must find use for the skills they have.
The result is a form of legal empiricism that is high in
methodological sophistication, but low in legal sophistication. Not
surprisingly, the form is much like the forms common in the scholars'
home disciplines.
To receive credit for what they can do, methodologically
sophisticated empirical scholars must also differentiate it from what
less methodologically sophisticated scholars can do and differentiate it
in ways that nonempirical scholars can recognize. One such way is to
promulgate bright-line rules as to the proper manner of doing
empiricism and then to point out that the unsophisticated scholars are
violating them. Even the nonempiricist can appreciate the significance
of a charge that rules have been broken. Even if the rules had no basis
in fact and the violations made no difference in outcome, the charges
may still be powerful because the nonempiricist audience may not
understand the disputes or the relationship between methodology and
outcome in the particular study.
Thus, Epstein and King could report empirical legal scholarship
to be "deeply flawed" in its entirety based on their finding that each of
231 articles violated some "rule of inference."' To make the charge
stick, they did not need to show that nonlegal empiricists were
following the rules, that the legal empiricists' violations were
significant, or that the violations materially affected the empiricists'
conclusions.
The effect of imposing an unbending set of "rules of inference"
on all empirical legal scholarship is to force every empiricist to
become methodologically sophisticated-whether the empiricist's
The competition among the more
work requires it or not.
sophisticated, combined with the enforcement of supposed "rules"
against the less sophisticated, has escalated empirical methods to
counterproductive levels. Even leading scholars seem to equate
"empiricism" with the small proportion of empirical studies that are so

107. See LoPucki, supra note 11 (manuscript at 31) (reporting an empirical finding
that J.D.-Ph.D.s and J.D.-only professors spend about the same length of time preparing for
careers in law teaching, making legal experience and Ph.D. training a direct trade-off in entrylevel hiring).
108. Epstein & King, supra note 20, at 15-16 (claiming to have read "all 231 articles
published in allAmerican law reviews between 1990 and 2000 that had the word 'empirical'
in their title"); id. at 17 (reporting that "every one we have read thus far--every single oneviolates at least one of the rules").
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large they require grant applications."
The hiring of Ph.D.s
contributes to that escalation.
Attitudes toward study size also contribute. "Small sample size"
is both a critique"o and a pejorative.' when used with respect to an
empirical study. Even though the charge of "small sample size" has no
validity when the findings are statistically significant, 2 the stock
advice given to empiricists is to increase their sample sizes. Epstein
and King, for example, "judge empirical research by how much
information the researcher brings to bear on the inference at issue."" 3
Empiricists respond by escalating and touting their sample and study
sizes."4
109. See, eg., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1353
(2002) (citing as the first barrier to "systematic empirical research" that "[flew professors
have ready access to financial support on the scale necessary for major empirical studies, and
fundraising is not a skill that academics generally have an interest in acquiring"); Peter H.
Schuck, Why Don'tLaw ProfessorsDo More EmpiricalResearch?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323,
332 (1989) (citing as a disincentive to empiricism that "[l]aw professors are not accustomed
to preparing lengthy grant applications; it is easier to get by on summer research funds").
110. Eg., Joni Hersch & Blair Druhan Bullock, The Use andMisuse ofEconometric
Evidence in Employment DiscrmnadonCases, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2365, 2404 (2014)
("These critiques were the three most common critiques mentioned by the court [in excluding
empirical evidence]: omitted variables, inadequate sample, and a lack of statistical
significance.").
111. Eg., Man Kee Choe, Book Review, 19 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 655, 657 (1998)
(reviewing

MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN ASIAN MARKETS

(Yoshiaki Takahashi et al. eds., 1998)) ("Thoughtful readers ... may hesitate to generalize the
empirical results of some chapters due to small sample size as well."); Lea-Rachel Kosnik,
Determinants of Contract Completeness: An Envionmental RegulatoryApplication, 37
INT'L REv L. & EcoN. 198, 199 (2014) ("The main problem with this study, however, is that
the empirical results are based on just 29 observations, which is a rather small sample size.");
Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110
COLUM. L. REv 1193, 1240 (2010) (referring to "small sample size" as a "methodological
problem[] with the empirical research").
112. As Hersch and Bullock put it, "Valid conclusions can certainly be drawn from
samples that are not very large, and finding statistically significant effects in smaller sample
sizes suggests that the estimated disparity is large, not that the estimates are invalid." Hersch
& Bullock, supranote 110, at 2390-91.
113. Epstein & King, supra note 20, at 102 ("We should also judge empirical research
by how much information the researcher brings to bear on the inference at issue."). I would
instead judge empirical research by its contribution to the literature. In law at least, larger
numbers of smaller studies are more likely to produce such contributions.
114. Eg., Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting Wile DrivingMeetsthe Fourth Amendment
Detemng Both Texting and Wamntless Cell Phone Searches 54 ARIZ. L. REv. 577, 584
(2012) ("In the largest study to date . . . ."); Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine
M. Porter, John A.E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankuptcy
Reform Fail? An Empiical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 391
(2008) ("The CBP IV is also the largest study to date . . . ."); Stephen J. Lubben, Corpomte
Reorganization& ProfessionalFees 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 79 (2008) (touting that "almost
more than 1,000 more cases than the next largest American study"); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson,
Twenty-Fhst Century Social Science on School RacialDiversity andEducationalOutcomes;
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These escalations of method have reduced scholarly production
in three ways. First, larger, more sophisticated studies require that
researchers devote more time to each study, which results in the
production of fewer studies. For example, entry-level Ph.D. hiring is
often based on a single empirical study-the candidate's dissertationthat may have taken years to produce. Second, the increasing demand
for sophistication deters scholars who would otherwise have done
studies requiring less sophistication. Third, maintaining and defending
their sophistication absorb researchers' time."'
Prominent legal empiricists have expressed concern that
minimum methodological standards impair the ability of law
professors to deliver research to policymakers in time for it to be
considered" or to deliver it at all."' Sophisticated methodology may
also detract from the effectiveness of work by bureaucratizing it,"'
rendering it unintelligible to persons outside the immediate field"' and
perhaps rendering it too time-consuming for even persons in the
immediate field to read.
Neither law schools nor any other part of the university can
entirely avoid the escalation of method. 20 Some problems actually
require sophisticated methodology. But by hiring fewer Ph.D.s in
69 Omo ST. L.J. 1173, 1212 (2008) (stating that the study was "arguably the largest study ever
conducted").
115. See Epstein & King, supra note 20, at 118 (advocating "the development of a
subfield of methodology within law").
116. Eg., Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Reahsm, and Improving the
Navigationoflhe Yellow Submarine, 80 TuL. L. REv 1161, 1185 n.99 (2006) ("Often we are
faced with a choice between doing nothing and relying on assumed facts or publishing a
study that other scholars cannot precisely replicate. Epstein and King write as if they
advocate doing nothing when our informants are unwilling to go on the record."); id at 1188
("We cannot insist on ideal methods and ideal data when the alternative is speculation (even
when the speculation comes packaged as fancy theory). . . .").
117. Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. Ci. L. REv. 153, 165 (2002) ("A universal insistence on Epstein and
King's version of methodological rigor might require making all studies less timely, thereby
eliminating studies that are both timely and accurate.").
118. For example, one scholar proposed requiring that all legal empiricists make the
same specified disclosures in reporting empirical results. Gregory Mitchell, EmpiricalLegal
Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REv 167, 200 (2004) ("[B]ecause we cannot
rely on law professor authors and law review editors to discern what specific disclosures
should be included to meet the replication norm, a better approach is to specify a set of welldefined, easily-implemented, mandatory rules to guide disclosure in empirical legal research
reports."). That requirement alone would make pervasive empiricism impossible.
119. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 967 ("[M]uch of the most important new work [in
law and economics] is increasingly incomprehensible to the remainder of the legal
professoriat.").
120. See id ("[L]aw and economics has become an important specialty of legal
research that demands increasingly specialized training to do important new work.").
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tenure-track positions and avoiding the temptation to privilege
sophisticated methodology, the law schools can reduce their share of
the costs of that escalation.
B.

Intzrnidation

Several years ago, a nonempiricist friend and colleague presented
a manuscript in which he made an interesting assumption about how
bankers would behave in a particular situation. I later asked him why
he had made the assumption. As I suspected, he told me he had called
a couple of bankers, and they told him that was what they did. My
next question was why he had not reported the calls in his
manuscript-scholars in the field would have found the report
interesting and useful. His response was that he feared being accused
of bad empiricism.
An empirical study based on a nonrandom sample of two is a
small empirical study, but not a bad one. It is not as good as an
empirical study with a sample of ten, but it is far better than no
empirical study at all. If my colleague-who probably had no
knowledge of the "rules of inference"-had reported the two
conversations, the report would in all likelihood have been perfectly
adequate for the purpose. Scholars probably would have cited it
frequently---even after someone published a study based on a larger
sample.
My colleague was correct, however, in perceiving a danger.
Disciplinarians are quick to issue across-the-board indictments of
factual reporting not licensed by formal training.12 ' One wrote,
"Research by ...

professors with no formal training in social science

methodology provides constant reminders of the limitations of
armchair empiricism."'22 Another referred to "amateur empiricists,
who do not have Ph.D.s or formal methodological training and who

121. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Refections on the Nature ofLegal Scholarship
in the Post-RealistEra, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 353, 424-25 (2008) ("Thus law professors
are generally, and quite understandably, insufficiently trained to engage in professional level
empirical or interdisciplinary scholarship."); Suchman & Mertz, supranote 33, at 558 ("ELS
scholars have made 'sophisticated methodology' into a shibboleth, and their definition is
often a narrow one."); John Pfaff, Mom on Counting: The Problem of Shady Statistics,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 30, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2013/04/more-on-counting-the-problem-of-shady-statistics.html (warning against "casually
running empirical models" and claiming "[iut can take years to fully understand what a
dataset looks like, what it is really measuring, its strengths and weaknesses").
122. Rhode, supranote 109, at 1343.
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may be guided more by instrumental than scientific concerns."' The
message is that those without years of formal training have no business
trying to observe reality.124
Balkin noted the connection between academic discipline and
punishment:
Academic disciplines ...

are about authority, and in particular, about

authority within particular groups of persons who think alike through
training and discipline. As such, this authority must be enforced by
punishments and rewards to ensure that the lessons of the discipline
become as second nature. If these lessons cannot or will not be
intemalized and if punishments and rewards fail, the apostate must be
excluded forthwith.'25
As if to prove this link between discipline and punishment, another law
professor wrote that "peer review should be viewed most
fundamentally as a mechanism for the enforcement of scientific norms
and conventions."'26
The escalation of empirical method in the law schools has made
the presentation of simple, straightforward empiricism at conferences
and workshops dangerous. Jealous of their empirical turf and often
ignorant of the subject of the presentation, sophisticated
methodologists routinely go after presenters' limited knowledge of
statistics. Warren and I sometimes advised our J.D.-only seminar
students who sought law school teaching positions that they should not
present their best work as job talks because the work was empirical
and this dynamic was so likely to develop.
123. Chambliss, supm note 47, at 33; see also Brian Leiter, Faculty Lists for
"EmpiricalLegal Studies," BlUAN LEITER'S L. SCH. REP. (Apr. 9, 2012), http://leiterlawschool.
typepad.com/leiter/2012/04/faculty-lists-for-empirical-legal-studies.html (directing that a
faculty list for "Empirical Legal Studies" should include only those "with the relevant
disciplinaryskills for empirical work" (emphasis added)).
124. See William M. Landes, The EmphicalSide ofLaw & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv 167, 178 (2003) ("Typically, [economic empirical] skills are acquired over several years
in the course of writing a dissertation in economics.").
125. Balkin, supm note 3, at 954. Others have also noted this connection:
Ultimately, at various points in various ways, editors, reviewers and
publishers can act as 'gatekeepers' of the field and its knowledge. Furthermore, it
is potentially possible for the editorial process, from the point of submission of a
manuscript to a journal to the published outcome, to become a disciplinary
mechanism; that is, scholarship is determined by the audit of work and resultant
decisions about what is published and what is rejected. We have termed this
"disciplining scholarship" ....
Tanya Fitzgerald & Helen M. Gunter, Educational Admnistration and Wstory Part 2:
Academic Journalsand the ContibutionofJEAH 40 J. EDUC. ADMIN. & HIsT. 23, 31 (2008).
126. Mitchell, supra note 118, at 176.
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Dull

Professor William Landes notes another limitation on the
quantity of empiricism resulting from Ph.D. hiring. Once they join law
faculties, many Ph.D.s eschew empiricism. Landes states that "many
economists (without law degrees) who are currently on law school
faculties ...

have done very little empirical research" and "law

professors with joint degrees (a law degree and a doctorate in
economics) have with a few exceptions also steered away from
empirical work."'27 The little empirical evidence available suggests that
Ph.D.s may be less likely than ID.-only professors to do original
empiricism.'
VI. CONCLUSION

Balkin considered law schools safe from disciplinary takeover
because invading disciplines first had to be transformed "into a form
of policy rhetoric that could be easily learned and adopted by
reasonably intelligent law professors with little or no previous
training."'" Otherwise, the invading disciplines "would not spread
widely into a culture of people trained primarily as lawyers." 30 Thus,

to enter the law schools, Balkin noted, economics had to leave its
empiricism behind.'3
The invasion Balkin envisioned was one of ideas, not people. He
did not anticipate that the indigenous members of law faculties might
elect colonists as their replacements.
Others have. Dean David Van Zandt argued that the "far more
effective approach is to hire scholars who bring strong training in the
disciplinary skills in addition to their legal training." 3 1
The research faculty of the future law school will be composed
largely of academics with a strong disciplinary training in one of the
social sciences ....

127. Landes, supranote 124, at 179.
128. SeesupaTable 1.
129. Balkin, supm note 3, at 968.
130. Id
131. Id ("The kind of economic analysis that spread most easily . .. was an economics
in which one made certain empirical assumptions, and one's opponent countered by making
different empirical assumptions, but neither was actually going to go out and test the
assumptions because neither was trained to do any such thing."). But see Landes, supm note
124, at 178 (arguing that "both demand and supply factors work to reduce the production of
empirical scholarship in law and economics").
132. Van Zandt, supm note 67, at 337.
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In such a discipline-based law faculty, the research faculty would not
consist of a large group of "real" law professors and a small number of
"exotic" social scientists who are castoffs from other departments.
Instead, almost every one of them would have a J.D. degree and some
experience in law practice[;] ... in addition each would be well trained
in a disciplinary approach, in most cases having earned a Ph.D.
Although Van Zandt did not mention it, the rich resources of the law
schools would facilitate the process by attracting colonists. J.D.-Ph.D.s
may choose law schools over their home departments because the law
schools pay more.'34

Van Zandt's description echoes George Priest's prediction twenty
years earlier: "The law school will of necessity become itself a
university. The law school will be comprised of a set of miniature
graduate departments in the various disciplines."' 35

Law faculties already specialize by areas of law. The most likely
accommodation between area specialization and disciplinary
specialization-and the one already reflected in law school hiring
patterns-is that disciplines will dominate related areas. Economics
will get business associations and bankruptcy; political science will get

constitutional law. Interdisciplinarity within the law schools will be
more, rather than less, difficult.
With the rate of Ph.D. hiring at top-26 schools currently at 67%,
the discipline-based law faculty Van Zandt envisioned is close to
becoming a reality.'36 I have estimated that if the current trends in
Ph.D. hiring continue, a majority of tenure-track law faculty will hold
Ph.D.s by 2028.'" Because law faculties generally hire in their own
image,' the likelihood of future Ph.D. hiring increases with the

133. Id. at 335.
134. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Failure of Cits and Leflist Law Professos To
Defend Progressive Causes, 24 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv 309, 330 (2013) (noting that law
professors "earn much more than professors in other fields"); Arthur Austin, Law Professor
Salares: The Deobjectification of Legal Scholarship by Tenured Radicals, 2 GREEN BAG
243, 243 (1999), http://www.greenbag.org/v2n3/v2n3_articlesaustin.pdf ("Law professors
are paid more than their colleagues in the arts and humanities.").
135. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School
as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 441 (1983).
136. See Van Zandt, supm note 67, at 335.
137. LoPucki, supra note 11 (manuscript at 41-42) (describing the basis for the
estimate).
138. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Labor Marketfor New Law Professors,
11 J. EMPHuCAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014) ("We find that law schools appear open to
nontraditional candidates in the early phases of the hiring process but when it comes to the
ultimate decision-hiring-they focus on candidates who look like current law professors.").
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growing proportions of Ph.D.s on those faculties. The process may
already be irreversible.
Advocates have long claimed that even low levels of Ph.D. hiring
would bring empiricism to legal scholarship. The law schools have
engaged in high levels of Ph.D. hiring, but the promised increase in
empiricism is now noticeably behind schedule. It is time to consider
the possibility that Ph.D. hiring is the problem rather than the solution.
Ph.D. hiring may be holding empiricism back by imposing
unnecessary rules and requirements on empirical work, by fostering a
wasteful escalation in methodology, by intimidating would-beproducers of empirical legal scholarship, and by starving faculties of
the legal experience they need to understand the system they are
supposed to study.
Both sides in this struggle agree that empiricism should be
pervasive in legal scholarship. Ph.D.-hiring advocates claim that only
Ph.D.s have the training and methodological sophistication to assess
reality competently. Discipline-based law faculties are the logical
extension of that claim.
My vision is of a different kind of empiricism. First, empiricism
is not a complex and mysterious skill that takes years of formal
training to acquire. Empiricism is the observation of realitysomething law professors have been doing all their lives. It should be
pervasive in the sense that assertions of fact and assumptions in legal
scholarship should be justified by reference to the best evidence
Second, the best
available-including anecdotal observation.
empiricism is not the empiricism that employs the most sophisticated
methodology. The best empiricism is that which generates the highest
levels of useful discovery and description. Third, empiricism and
statistics are not the same thing. Law professors can be skilled
empiricists without being statisticians.
If law schools continue on their current course, my vision of
empiricism will not be realized. Ph.D.-dominated law faculties will
value methodological sophistication over empirical discovery. They
will cut legal scholarship off from the source of its intellectual
vitality-legal practice-and end its intellectual diversity. Instead of
requiring every empiricist to be a statistician, law schools should
provide non-tenure-track statisticians to assist empiricists. The
standard for hiring empiricists should not be methodological
sophistication, but proven ability to advance discovery and knowledge
in law.

